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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

••

Plaintiff-Respondent,

••

-v-

.•

RAYMOND JOE VIGIL,

Case No. 18118

••

Defendant-Appellant.

••

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery, a
first-degree.felony,- in violation of.Utah Code Ann.,

76-6-

§

302 ( 1953), as amenfled, and attempted criminal homicide, a
second-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.,

§

76-5-

203 (1953), as amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was tried before a jury and was found
guilty on both charges on October 21, 1981 in the Third
Judi·cia~

District, the Honorable Peter F. Leary presiding.

Appellant was sentenced

O~tober

21, 1981 to an indeterminate

term of five years to life in the Utah State Prison for the
aggravated robbery conviction, and to an indeterminate term of
not less than one year and not more than 15 years in the Utah
State Prison for the attempted criminal homicide conviction.
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Each of these sentences is to run concurrently with the
sentence the appellant is presently serving.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmance of appellant's
convictions and sentences.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On July 26, 1981, a Pinto car owned by Tracy Neely
from Idaho, who was visiting appellant, was observed at about
1 a.m. at a Winchell's Donut Shop at 1465 South State Street
in Salt Lake City (T. 43).

Two male Mexican-Americans with

stocking masks over their heads entered the donut shop (T.
43).

Robert Sherwood and George Bowie were discussing a

fishing trip at a nearby motel; they recognized the probable
criminal activity and telephoned the police (T. 43-44).
The masked men, one of whom was carrying a firearm,
went behind the counter inside the donut shop, held the gun in
the baker's face and ordered the baker to open the cash
register (T. 5).

The baker was hit in the mouth with a fist

before he was able to open the cash register, after which he
was told to lie on the floor with his face down (T. 5).

The

men took $136 out of the cash register (T. 6), left the store,
nran to a corner street, made a right turn ano disappeared"

(T. 44).
-2-
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Rick Lewis, a police officer, was patrolling in a
marked patrol car near the area of the donut shop and received
information from a police dispatcher that the robbery suspects
were driving a yellow Pinto car (T. 51).

The officer noticed

a Pinto car matching the description as he approached a stop
·light at the intersection of 1700 South and State Street (T.
52).

He followed the Pinto car as it headed west, radioed for

assistance (T. 52), and followed the Pinto car as it turned
north onto Jefferson Street, which became a dead end street
after a short distance (T. 53).
patrol car's

overhea~

The officer activated the

lights and the Pinto car stopped (T.

55) •. Another .. police officer, Terry Opheikens, arrived in
another patrol car and stopped adjacent to Office Lewis' car

(T. 56).
Using the patrol car's public address system,
Officer Lewis instructed the Pinto car's occupants to roll
down the car's windows and extend their hands into Lewis' view
(T. 56).

The passenger on the right side of the car attempted

to get out of the Pinto, but Lewis told him to remain inside,
after which the Pinto's engine was started and the car
accelerated· down the street (T. 57).

The officers pursued

with their vehicles; they noticed that the Pinto had reached
the dead end, had turned around, and was headed toward them;
and the officers set up a roadblock with the patrol cars (T.
58-59).

As the Pinto approached the roadblock, a firearm
-3-
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from the passenger-side window was pointed at Lewis, who drew
his revolver and fired six shots at the Pinto (T. 60).
Several shots were fired at Lewis from the Pinto car (T. 61).
Because of the distance between Lewis' and
Opheikens' cars, the Pinto broke through the roadblock after
striking Opheikens' patrol car (T. 61).

The Pinto proceeded

down the street a short distance before stopping, with the
three occupants exiting and running onto the driveway of a
private residence (T. 62).

A search of the area uncovered the

appellant, who was hiding under aluminum sheet metal near a
garage in the back yard of a private residence (T. 65).

Leo

and Rudy Duran were found in a nearby field, lying face down
on top of a shaving kit which contained two money envelopes
with about $135, a pair of panty hose with one of the legs cut
off and a pair of gloves (T. 143-146).

A revolver with four

empty cartridges was also found in shrubbery by a fence in the
backyard of the residence near where appellant was hiding (T.
123).
Leo ann Rudy Duran pled guilty to attempted criminal
homicide, and were sentenced to indeterminate terms of not
less than one year and not more than 15 years at the Utah
State Prison.

Appellant was tried by a jury and convicted of

attempted criminal homicide and aggravated robbery,
convictions from which he now appeals.

-4-
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ARGUMENT
THE PROSECUTOR'S COMMENTS DURING CLOSING
ARGUMENTS ON THE GUILTY PLEA OF A DEFENSE
WITNESS WERE RESTRICTED TO THE EVIDENCE
ADMITTED AT TRIAL AND WERE NOT IMPROPER.
The appellant does not argue insufficiency or other
defects in the evidence producen against him at trial.

His

only claim concerns the closing arguments made by the
prosecutor and the limits imposed by the trial judge on the
closing arguments of appellant's counsel.

Appellant's claim

focuses on the testimony of defense witness Leo Duran.
After the prosecution had presented its case in
chief, the defense callen Leo Duran as a witness.

During

direct examination by defense counsel, Duran testified as
.follows:
Ms. Wells:
Leo, have you recently entered
a plea of guilty to any charges having to
do with the charges that are now facing
Mr. Vigil?
Leo Duran:

Yes.

Ms. Wells:
What have you enterea a plea
of guilty to?
Leo Duran:

Attempted criminal homicide.

Ms. Wells: Was that a result of any plea
negotiations with the State?
Leo Duran:

Yes.

Ms. Wells:
with?

What else were you charged

-5-
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Leo Duran:

Aggravated robbery.

Ms. Wells: And what happened when you
entered a plea of guilty to the attempted
criminal homicide? What happened to the
other case?
Leo Duran:

They dropped it.

Ms. Wells: Have you been sentenced on
that matter yet?
Leo Duran:

Yes.

Ms. Wells:

What sentence did you receive?

Leo Duran:

I received a l-to-15.

Ms. Wells:

What does that mean?

Leo Duran:
I will be sent to the prison
to do my time.
Ms. Wells: Are you presently in custody
awaiting transference to the prison?
Leo Duran:

Yes.

Ms. Wells: Now, Leo, other than an
attempted criminal homicide which you have
just spoken about, have you been convicted
of any other felony offenses?
Leo Duran:

In the past?

Ms. Wells:

Yes, in the past.

Leo Duran:

Yes.

Ms. Wells:

What was that?

Leo Duran:

Attempted aggravated burglary.

Ms. Wells:

When was that?

Leo Duran:

Five-six years ago.

As an adult.

(T. 152-153).
-6-
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Duran testified that he and Rudy Duran, Leo's
brother who also pled guilty to attempted criminal hornicioe,

hao robbed the Winchell's Donut Shop (T. 155-158), and
afterwards .they returned to a party where appellant was (T.
158).

Duran further stated that he, Rudy and appellant then

decided· to· ~isit a friend in a hospital (T. 158-159).

While

driving to the hospital, Duran said a police officer stopped
them (T. 160).

On cross-examination by the prosecutor, Leo

Duran admitted that his testimony was the first time he had
told anyone about this version of the events on July 26, 1981

(T. 177).
After the prosecution and defense had presented
their evidence, the prosecutor made his closing arguments.
During the defense counsel's closing argument, she commented
on the plea bargains of Rudy and Leo Duran.

Defense counsel

stated:
Now, we know that an aggravated robbery
occurred. We know th~~ two persons
committed that aggravated robbery.
Yet,
we also know that Mr. Leo Duran did not
plead guilty to the crime of agqravated
robbery.
(T. 199-200).

The prosecutor objected to these comments.

The

trial court··sustained the objection and admonished the jury to
disregard the comments (T. 200).
Durinq rebuttal to the defense attorney's closing
arguments, prosecutor Mr. Jones stated:
-7-
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Finally, ask yourselves this question:
If
there was no attempten homicide in this
case, no evidence of an attempted
homicide, why is it that Leo Duran walked
into court yesterday and took the stand
and told you-( At this point, defense counsel objected
but the trial judge asked the prosecutor
to continue. )
Why is it that Mr. Duran took the stand in
this case and told you that he pled guilty
to that offense of an attempted homicide?
That fact should inidicate to you that
there was an attempted homicide in this
case. It is absolutely contrary to
defense counsel's argument.
( T. 218-219) •

After the jury left the room, defense counsel moved
to dismiss, stating:
• • • in that during my closing argument
my attempt to explain the position of Leo
and Rudy Duran • • • my comments were
objected to and the Court sustained that
objection. I immediately desisted from
that.
However, Mr. Jones [the prosecutor]
in his argument did make comment with
regard to the plea bargain and Mr. Duran's
having plea guilty to an offense and that
he pled guilty to it because he was guilty
of it. I believe that was in error and
highly prejudicial, and if nothing more he
should not have been allowed to proceed.
The trial court denied the motion (T. 221).
Appellant attempts to characterize the closing
arguments of the prosecutor on the Duran brothers' guilty
pleas as similar to the closing arguments made by the
appellant's attorney.

Because the judge allowed the closing

arguments of the prosecutor, appellant claims that it was
-8-
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··II

then prejudicial to limit the defense attorney's arguments on
Leo and Rudy Duran's guilty pleas.

A review of the prosecutor's closing arguments on
the guilty pleas reveals that he was simply restating to the
jury the testimony of Leo Duran.

Mr. Duran, a defense

witness, stated on direct examination that he had pled guilty
to attempted criminal homicide, a charge arising out of the
same circumstances that were facing appellant (T. 152).

The

prosecutor in closing argument said that Leo Duran pled guilty
to attempted criminal homicide, which indicated that there was
an attempted criminal homicide.

Pleading guilty to a crime is

equivalent to admitting that Duran committed the crime; he had
admitted facts that supported the crime charged.

State v.

Harris, _Utah, 585 P.2d 450 (1978).
Appellant cites Lewis v. State, 569 P.2d 486 (Okla.
1977) for the proposition that the prosecutor could not tell
the jury that a guilty plea means admitting the facts without
also telling the jury "the ramifications of the Durans'
respective pleas" (appellant's brief, p. 8).

The Lewis case

is clearly distinguishable from the present case because Lewis
involved improper closing arguments by the prosecutor who gave
his opinion on the guilt of defendant before defendant's guilt
had been decided by repeatedly stating the defendant had lied.
In the present case, the prosecutor did not give his opinion
-9-
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of appellant's guilt and the guilt of Leo Duran had been
previously decideo.

Leo Duran's guilt was no longer at issue,

as was that of the defendants in Lewis v. State, supra.
It is the prerogative and the duty of either counsel
to analyze all aspects of the evidence and to make any
pertinent statements or deductions reasonably to be drawn
therefrom as to what the evidence is or is not and what it
does or does not show.
(1975).

State v. Kazda, Utah, 540 P.2d 949

A prosecutor has the duty and right to argue the case

based on the total picture shown by the evidence or the lack
thereof.

State v. Hales, Utah,

P.2d

(Case No.

18083, decided July 7, 1982); State v. Bautista, 30 Utah 2d
112, 514 P.2d 530 (1973).

Counsel for both sides have

considerable latitude in their arguments to the jury, and have
the right to discuss fully from their standpoints the
evidence, inferences and deductions arising therefrom.

State

v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422 (1973); State v.
_,/'

Gaxiola, Utah, 550 P.2d 1298 (1976).

The Utah Supreme Court

in Valdez, at 426, stated:
The test of whether the remarks made by
counsel are so objectionable as to merit a
reversal in a criminal case is, did the
remarks call to the attention of the
jurors matters which they would not be
justified in considering in determining
their verdict, and were they, under the
circumstances of the particular case,
probably influenced by those remarks.
The
-10-
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determination of whether the improper
remarks have influenced a verdict is
within the sound discretion of the trial
court on motion for a new trial.
If there
be no abuse of this discretion and
substantial justice appears to have been
done, the appellate court will not reverse
the judgment.
Under the Valdez test, it is clear that the
prosecutor did not call to the attention of the jurors in the
instant case matters which thev would not be justified in
~

considering to determine the appellant's guilt.

The

prosecutor made a common sense observation of fact that the
jurors could not fail to notice:

that Leo Duran pled guilty

to attempted criminal homicide and that the crime actually did
occur.

The prosecutor did not say or insinuate that the

statement was·based on personal knowledge or on anything other
than Leo Duran's testimony given before the jury.

The

prosecutor did not indicate his opinion of the appellant's
guilt.
A review of defense counsel's arguments shows that
she committed error, not the prosecutor.
Valdez and

~axiola,

Appellant cites

both supra, for the proposition that both

sides can argue the evidence, and inferences and deductions
arising therefrom.

This is a correct statement of the Utah

case law; however, the defense attorney was not discussing the
evidence, inferences or deductions.

Defense counsel was

attempting to introduce new evidence, to wit:

reasons for the

nurans' guilty pleas.
-11-
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Plea discussions and plea agreements are not
admissible either for or against the appellant in any judicial
proceeding.

United States v. Smith, 525 F.2d 1017 (10th Cir.

1975); United States v. Ross, 493 F.2d 771 (5th Cir. 1974);
State v. Byrd, 453 P.2d 22 (Kan. 1969); People v. Hamilton,
383 P.2d 412 (Cal. 1963).

Admitting plea discussions into

evidence would in effect defeat the purpose of plea

barg~ins.

Using plea bargaining statements in later proceedings will
discourage people charged with crimes from entering guilty
pleas when plea negotiations could be used against them in
later proceedings.

Defense counsel in this case attempted to

introduce evidence of plea bargaining, which is improper.

The

trial judge correctly prevented defense counsel from
introducing the reasons for the Durans' guilty pleas.
In addition, there was no evidence at trial for the
reasons the Durans pled guilty.

An attempt to introduce

statements by defense counsel about the guilty pleas
constitutes unsworn testimony.

Comments

by

counsel which are

outside the record and therefore not based on the testimony
and issues of the trial are generally regarded as unsworn
testimony and improper.

Hotel Riviera, Inc. v. Short, 396

P.2d 855 (Nev. 1964); Fitzgerald v. State, 219 P.2d 1024
(Okla. Crim. App. 1950); People v. Houqhton, 212 Cal. App. 2d
864, 28 Cal. Rptr. 351 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); People v.
Wright, 232 N.Y.S.2d 767 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962).
-12-
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In the instant case defense counsel was attempting
to testify to matters not in evidence rather than anvocating
her client's cause.

If the defense attorney would have wanted

to testify as a witness, she should have been sworn and have
given the prosecutor an opportunity to cross-examine her.

The

defehse attorney was properly prevented by the trial judge
from commenting on matters not testified to at the trial.
Defense counsel's closing arguments and attempts to
comment on plea bargaining of Leo and Rudy Duran are also
improper because the comments attempt to vouch for the
credibility of Leo Duran.

The intronuction of unsworn matters

during closing arguments is an attempt to bolster Leo Duran's
testimony.

These attempts to bolster the testimony of Leo

Duran were.calculated to induce the jurors to believe that the
defense attorney knew Leo Duran's reputation for truth and was
therefore entitled to absolute credence about everything Leo
Duran said.
Defense counsel attempts to bolster the credibility
of Leo Duran by proffering reasons why Duran had pled guilty
other than that a crime had occurred.

Defense counsel has a

right .to.··argue ·the credibility of a witness when counsel
confines that argument to.the evidence and fair inferences
that arise therefrom, but defense counsel has no right to
search beyond the record and state extraneous facts either in
support or in derogation of a witness' credibility.

-13-
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State v.

Wilson, 554 S.W.2d 511 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); People v. Poe, 183
N.W.2d 628 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970); State v. Rraathen 1 43 N.W.2d
202 (N.D. 1950); Sequin v. Hauser Motor Co., 350 So.2d 1089
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Rinnle v. state, 363

s.w.2a

264

(Tex. Crim. App. 1963).
Moreover, the determination whether improper
remarks, if any, of counsel during arguments to the jury have
influenced a verdict lies within the discretion of the trial
court.
(1973).

State v. Bautista, 30 Utah 2d 112, 514 P.2d 530
If there is no abuse of discretion and substantial

justice appears to have been done, the appellate court will
not reverse the judgment.
P.2d 422 (1973).
was prejudiced.

State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 513

Appellant in this case has not shown that he
Appellant speculates why the Durans pled

guilty, none of the speculations being in evidence at trial.
More importantly, appellant has not shown that these
speculations on a witness' guilty plea would have influenced
the jury's mind as to the guilt of appellant.

The issue at

trial was whether appellant was guilty, not whether a witness
could plead guilty for reasons other than that the witness
committed the crime.
There was no prejudice to appellant in this case.
The evidence was clear and decisive, and the trial court's
judgment should be upheld, notwithstanding any alleged
misconduct on the part of the prosecutor or the trial judge.
Se~

State v. Patterson, Utah,

P.2d

(Case No. 17610,

decided November 5, 1982).
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A

Winchell's Donut Shop was robbed at about l a.m.,

with several witnesses testifying to the details of the
robbery and the robbers' car.

Shortly thereafter, police

officers attempted to stop a car matching the description of
the robbers' get-away vehicle.

The three occupants, appellant

and Leo and Rudy Duran, resisted the arrest and fired several
shots from a revolver as the car broke through the police
officers' roadblock.

The three occupants of the car were

found near the abandoned car.
The evidence in this case is overwhelming.

The

jury's verdict was not affected by the trial court's refusal
to allow the defense attorney to comment during closing
arguments on a witness' guilty plea.

The jury was not misled

thereby into doing something it would not otherwise have done.
CONCLUSION
The prosecutor's closing arguments were properly
limited to the evidence admitted at trial.

Defense counsel,

however, attempts to show prejudice to appellant because
defense counsel was not allowed to comment on Leo Duran's
guilty plea during closing argument.

The trial judge did not

commit reversible error because defense counsel was attempting
to introduce new evidence.

Plea negotiations, which defense

counsel attempted to argue in her closing statement, cannot be
admitted at trial.

Defense counsel also cannot bolster the
-15-
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testimony of witnesses during closing argument

Furthermore,

because the evidence is· overwhelming in this case, appellant
has not shown that there was prejudice in limiting defense
counsel's closing argument or that the jury would have been
influenced otherwise.
Based upon the foregoing, respondent urges that the
convictions and sentences of appellant be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this

}~tJ:i.. day

of November,

1982.

ROBERT N. PARRISH
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed three true and exact
copies of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Brooke C.
Wells, Attorney for Appellant, Salt Lake Legal Defender
Assoc., 333 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, this

/2

day of November, 1982.
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